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Although Russia and the Baltics have historically been economic partners, the 
economic relations between them are tense today. Nearly stagnating bilateral trade 
contributes little to the development of either side. The Baltics-Russian bilateral 
trade conducted within global value chains (GVCs) and operations of multinational 
companies is much more resistant to geopolitical and economic shocks than 
traditional international trade. For instance, the accession of Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania to the EU and NATO in 2004 and the introduction of reciprocal EU-Russia 
sanctions in 2014 did not curb GVC activities between Russia and the Baltics. The 
article discusses factors in the transformation of the Baltics-Russian GVCs amid 
COVID-19. The research aims to prove regionalisation to be a viable prospect for the 
transformation of global value chains in Russia and the Baltics. In the medium term, 
regionalisation is possible as (1) part of global trends towards GVC transformation 
in the industries in which Russia and the Baltics traditionally specialise; (2) a 
response to the long-term structural challenges faced by Russia and the Baltics 
in creating a new generation of internationally competitive firms; (3) a result of 
companies tackling the effects of the pandemic against the background of historically 
stable relationships; (4) a product of strong social contacts and soft power. GVC 
regionalisation will be driven by individual companies, regional (local) governments, 
and Russian-Baltic cross-border cooperation initiatives. Finally, repercussions for 
Russian and Baltic politics are discussed alongside GVC regionalisation benefits for 
all the parties involved.
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Introduction
Global value chains (GVCs) have been at the centre of the discussion of the 
global economy since the early days of the COVID-19 crisis [1]. The suspension 
of production in China as part of anti-epidemic measures compromised the sup-
ply stability for European and American companies, the problem is known as 
“contamination through the supply chain” [1]. At the same time, discussions on 
the transformation of global chains and the consequences for global production 
had been on the agenda long before the pandemic began1 [2; 3]. The shocks asso-
ciated with the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic have thus become a catalyst 
for the transformation of GVCs.
Although earlier literature has noted that exposure to external shocks is 
characteristic of small countries with a high intensity of participation in foreign 
trade2, later studies have indicated that vulnerability to external shocks is char-
acteristic of all the countries intensively involved in GVCs, regardless of their 
size [4]. Thus, both the Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, with their 
small open economies whose catching-up development was largely associated 
with the transformation of their positioning in global production networks [5, 
p. 32—33; 6, p. 23—24; 7, p. 26—31], and Russia with its large, resource-based 
economy and persisting problems of the transformation period and the export 
portfolio that is limited in terms of high value-added manufacturing goods [8, 
p. 10—12] could be attributed to such countries. Despite the differences in the 
size of the economies, their resource endowments, and structural features, com-
mon challenges remain for the Baltic states and Russia in the context of integra-
tion into global production: a small share of firms operating in foreign markets, 
a low share of technology leaders, low productivity, and the need to reposition 
themselves in global chains. The close foreign economic relations between the 
Baltic states and Russia have been inherited since the times of the Soviet Union, 
however, over the past three decades, the political relations of the countries have 
experienced difficult times, while foreign economic cooperation has not contrib-
uted to solving the common challenges of transformation and repositioning in 
global production networks.
The article aims to discuss the prospects for the transformation of GVCs 
in Russia and the Baltic states and to identify the factors contributing to such 
transformation at the present stage by considering the accumulating challenges, 
1 International Production Beyond the Pandemic, 2020, UNCTAD World Investment Report 
2020. URL: https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2020_en.pdf (accessed 05.08.2020).
2 Small States: Meeting Challenges in the Global Economy, Report of the Commonwealth 
Secretariat, 2020, World Bank Joint Task Force on Small States. URL: http://www.cpahq.org/
cpahq/cpadocs/meetingchallengeinglobaleconomyl.pdf (accessed 05.08.2020).
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the catalyst of which was the COVID-19 pandemic3. The paper shows why the 
regionalization of GVCs as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic can be 
considered a “window of opportunity” for transforming economic cooperation 
between Russia and the Baltic states and discuss the implications for Russian 
economic policy aimed at supporting the regionalization of chains and expanding 
cooperation with the Baltics.
The peculiarities of the GVCs in Russia and the Baltics are assessed by using 
modern methods of analysis typical of research in the field of international and 
regional economics, including statistical analysis of data from the EORA-GVC 
Database, TiVA OECD, and AMNE OECD, which make it possible to identify the 
structural features of value chains of Russia and the Baltic states, as well as the 
specifics of the activities of Russian and Baltic multinational companies in host 
economies.
Features of global value chains  
in Russia and the Baltic states
The Baltic states are actively involved in GVCs and have vertically and geo-
graphically fragmented production mainly focused on their neighbouring markets 
[5, p. 27—28; 9, p. 5—9; 10, p. 9—10]. Despite the continuing lag in the level 
of development of some countries within the Baltic region, it should be noted 
that the way Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia integrate into GVCs generally corre-
sponds to that of their neighbouring countries: Germany, Sweden, Finland, and 
Poland (Fig. 1). The assumption is based on a similar level of backward linkag-
es4, the dependence of export-oriented industries on imported components and 
semi-finished products (on average for the Baltic region5 — 25.3%, for the Baltic 
states — 27.0%), as well as on the similar level of forward linkages6 using ex-
port value added in the production of third countries: Baltic region countries — 
19.6%, and Baltic states — 17.5%.
3 By regionalization of value chains in this article, the authors understand the geographic 
reorientation of value chains from global markets to macroregional markets, including the 
replacement of global suppliers and buyers with counterparties from the domestic macroregion, 
the search for networks of suppliers and networks of buyers in the markets of neighboring 
countries.
4 Backward linkages — foreign value added embodied in a country’s gross exports, % of a 
country’s gross exports.
5 In this research the Baltic region countries are understood as Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Sweden.
6 Forward linkages — domestic value added embodied in foreign exports,% of the country’s 
gross exports.
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Fig. 1. Positioning of Russia and the Baltic states in GVCs, 2015
Note: Data for the last available year was used.
Source: Authors’ calculations, data from TiVA OECD.
Russia, by contrast, is somewhat aloof (on the “periphery”) in its participation 
in GVCs [8, p. 7—8]: it differs from the Baltic region countries, on the one hand, 
by too-short backward linkages (10.8% against 25.3%), and on the other hand, by 
too-long forward linkages (30.5% against 19.6%).
Over the past decades, economic cooperation between Russia and the Baltic 
states has passed through several stages largely determined by tense political re-
lations which to a significant extent shaped the current nature of the interaction. 
The Baltics were actively integrated into the economic space of the USSR before 
leaving the Soviet Union in 1990 [11, p. 88—89; 12, p. 10—11]. The period from 
the 1990s to the mid-2000s was characterized by the shift of the Baltics’ econom-
ic focus from Russia to Western Europe. This was primarily associated with the 
formation of new foreign trade partnerships, the search for new markets (in the 
early stages), and later, the preparatory stage for the accession of the Baltic states 
to the European Union (EU) in 2004. Thus, while in 1991, over 45% of the total 
imports of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were of Russian origin [13, p. 38], at the 
beginning of the 2000s, the share of Russian origin products in imports was 11% 
in Latvia, 14% in Estonia, 27.4% in Lithuania. At the same time, studies have 
shown a slow reorientation of mutual foreign trade of the former Soviet territories 
and the preservation of the linkages formed in the Soviet era. The explanations 
for this phenomenon are, for example, the inertia in infrastructure development 
(including roads and railways, telecommunications networks, logistics operators, 
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and the business community) to access other markets, lower competitiveness of 
these economies compared to that of the Nordic countries and Germany, and the 
presence of historically formed inter-firm ties [14, p. 88—89; 15, p. 9—10; 16, 
p. 37—38]. The high importance of “colonial linkages” as a factor in internation-
al trade is confirmed by studies of the countries of the former Soviet Union, as 
well as of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, British Malaya, and Czechoslo-
vakia [15; 17, p. 92—93].
The slow pace of the reorientation of foreign trade of the Baltic states to the 
markets of the EU countries can also be explained by the high significance of the 
historically established ties for the EU countries. Thus, the founding members of 
the EU were primarily focused on the creation of an integrated internal market 
and supported the development of trade relations among themselves rather than 
with the countries that joined the EU later [18, p. 1339—1349].
Before 2004, many observers noted that the accession of the Baltic states to 
the EU and NATO would help restructure historically tense relations with Russia. 
However, Europeanization did not contribute to a positive scenario [19, p. 1]. 
Since 2004, the policy of the Baltic states in relations with Russia has been de-
termined primarily by the common foreign economic policy of the EU countries, 
as well as by the policy of cross-border cooperation [13, p. 37; 12, p. ten]. For 
the Baltic states, although the accession to the EU established de jure grounds for 
expanding international trade with Russia, de facto, there have been no changes. 
After the onset of the global financial and economic crisis, the 2004—2008 peri-
od of some expansion of mutual trade between the Baltic states and Russia gave 
way to a period of cooling of bilateral relations.
The 2014 Ukrainian crisis resulted in the imposition of mutual economic sanc-
tions between Russia and the Baltic states and determined a further cooling of 
foreign economic relations. The fact that the Baltics have been the main sup-
porters of sanctions against Russia led to a significant reduction in the volume of 
mutual trade between the countries compared to that with other EU countries [20, 
p. 1504—1505].
Changes in the general framework for relations between the Baltic states and 
Russia and the associated effects of “trade diversion” [12, p. ten; 13, p. 36—37] 
in the reorientation of foreign trade to the EU countries were weakly connected 
with cooperative relationships within GVCs. The volumes of value added im-
ported by the Baltic states from Russia for subsequent export had been gradually 
growing from 2000 to 2019 increasing by 10.4 times by the end of the period 
against the background of the recession resulting from the global financial and 
economic crisis of 2008—2009 and the introduction of the mutual sanctions. 
This more than tenfold growth was ensured, primarily, by the increase in imports 
of energy resources (by 18.5 times) for export-oriented industries of the Baltic 
states, as well as products of the agro-industries (by 9.9 times) and chemical and 
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Fig. 2. Participation of the Baltic states in the backward GVC linkages: the left axis — 
the share of value added from Russia, the USA, Germany and China in the imports of 
the Baltic states for subsequent exports, 2000—2019; right axis — value added from 
Russia in imports of the Baltic states for subsequent export, mln USD
Note: Data for the three global GVC hubs (China, Germany and the United States) 
are given for comparison.
Source: authors’ calculations, data from EORA-GVC Database, World Bank.
Russia also increased the volume of value added imported from the Baltic 
states within the GVC, which in absolute value increased by 7.4 times in 2000—
2019. However, this effect was associated with a general increase in imported 
value added and in relative terms did not lead to an increase in Russia’s impor-
tance as the Baltic states’ partner in the backward GVC (Fig. 3).
It should be noted that the introduction of mutual sanctions in 2014 had a 
moderate impact on trade volumes. The fact that there was no sharp decline 
should be attributed to the permission to continue foreign trade in products sub-
ject to sanctions, the contracts on which were concluded before the period of their 
introduction [21, p. 13].
In addition, against the general background, Russia’s imports from countries 
that did not impose sanctions also decreased. This was a consequence of the depre-
ciation of the ruble and, accordingly, of the increase in the cost of imports, which 
is consistent with the research results [22, p. 307]. The lack of pronounced reori-
entation from countries that have imposed sanctions on other countries may also 
be the evidence that in reality (at least in 2015—2019) there was no substitution 
of trade channels. Although there is some evidence of a shift in supply channels 
(e. g., the re-export of goods from Belarus that were subject to the Russian trade 
embargo, such as fruit and shrimp [23, p. 6—8]), this does not change the general 
conclusion that Russian exports have decreased in all directions [21, p. 13].
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Fig. 3. Russia’s participation in the backward GVC links: the left axis is the share of 
value added from the Baltic states, the USA, Germany and China in Russia’s imports for 
subsequent exports, 2000—2019,%; right axis — value added from the Baltic states in 
Russia’s import for subsequent export, mln USD
Note: Data for the three global GVC hubs — China, Germany and the United 
States — are given for comparison.
Source: authors’ calculations, data from EORA-GVC Database, World Bank.
Thus, the results obtained generally indicate the stability of bilateral cooper-
ative economic relations to geopolitical shocks and a significantly greater (com-
pared with traditional international trade) resistance to economic shocks.
This sustainability is due to two factors: sectoral and organizational (with the 
participation of multinational companies [MNCs]) the peculiarities of GVCs.
With the view of the significant cross-country differences in resource endow-
ments and sectoral structure of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, economic cooper-
ation between Russia and the Baltic states within the GVC has developed basing 
on bilateral economic interests in sectors with comparative advantage. As a result, 
the sectoral structure of trade between Russia and the Baltic states within GVCs 
differs significantly from the commodity structure of the traditional non-chain 
merchandise trade largely based on the legacy of Soviet economic links. In Rus-
sian merchandise imports from the Baltic states, products of electrical and power 
engineering and equipment prevail (approximately 40%), and in the imports to 
the Baltic states from Russia, oil and oil products (approximately 65%) prevail. 
The sectoral structure of trade between Russia and the Baltic states within the 
GVC is distinguished by a significantly higher level of diversification, it also 
reflects the sericitization of the manufacturing sector in the GVC (participation 
of services in production and foreign trade in goods) [24, p. 2—3]. In the imports 
to the Baltic states from Russia within chains, oil and oil products continue to ac-
count for a significant share (47%), but another 27% is accounted for by trade in 
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services, including wholesale trade and transportation services (23.2% in total), 
as well as business services requiring a high level of human capital7 (3.8%). In 
Russia’s imports from the Baltic states within the chains, the share of services is 
even higher (40.4%), it includes trade and transport services (23.9%), as well as 
services requiring highly skilled labour (8.4%; Fig. 4). The high contribution of 
the service sector to the exports of the Baltic states reflects, on the whole, a higher 
orientation of these countries toward trade in services [25, p. 293—294].
Fig. 4. Trade in value added in GVCs between Russia and the Baltic states  
by selected commodity groups, 2015,%
Note: Backward linkages of the Baltic states in Russia’s GVCs — value added of 
the industry created in Russia and used in the exports of the Baltic states,% of gross 
value-added imports from Russia for use in the exports of the Baltic states; Russia’s 
backward linkages in the GVCs of the Baltic states — value added of the industry creat-
ed in the Baltic states and used in Russian exports,% of gross value added imports from 
the Baltic states for use in Russian exports.
Source: Authors’ calculations, data from TiVA OECD.
In 2000—2017, the services not related to industrial production increased 
in terms of added value in the global chains of Russia. This is the evidence of 
the expanding cooperation between the parties in the non-production sector, as 
well as the indirect evidence of the growing role of “soft power” in economic 
cooperation. Thus, in 2000—2017, the value added from the Baltic states in the 
Russian education increased by 14.4 times; in the sphere of health and social 
services, by 11.7 times; and in the sphere of real estate services, by 9.2 times. 
7 Including research and development, ICT services, finance and insurance services.
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Imports of added value from Russia to the Baltic states increased 22.4 times in 
education, and 14.2 times in real estate services. High growth rates in mutual 
value-added trade in the sector of services show that the formation of industrial 
ties between the countries is largely due to the bi-directional movement of the 
population between Russia and the Baltic states, as well as the presence of na-
tional diasporas.
The high level of ‘servitization’ of trade within the GVCs of Russia and the 
Baltic states determines the significantly lower volatility of value-added trade 
from geopolitical and economic shocks and at the same time is a growth point 
for the transformation of chains in the region and the increase in the share of 
value added.
GVCs are often organized by the activities of multinational companies8. 
MNCs are involved in international production through horizontal (within one 
industry) and vertical (in related industries) investment projects. They also de-
velop interaction with independent companies abroad through other types of in-
dustrial cooperation (i. e. contract manufacturing, franchising, licensing). Thus, 
the boundaries of multinational companies and GVCs largely intersect but do not 
coincide [26, p. 54—55].
Our estimates show that the extent of the presence of Russian multinational 
companies in the markets of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, as well as that of 
Baltic MNCs in the Russian market, has changed somewhat over the past two 
decades. The introduction of mutual sanctions in 2014 did not significantly af-
fect the change in the market positions of MNCs on both sides (Fig. 5). Thus, 
in 2005—2016, the average share of Russian MNCs in the Estonian market was 
1.6%; in the Lithuanian market — 7.3%; and in Latvia — 4.9%. The share of 
Baltic MNCs in the gross output in Russia was 0.6%. Structural changes in the 
composition of MNCs of host economies observed in 2005—2016 resulted from 
the use of comparative advantages by companies in the markets of partner coun-
tries. Among the MNCs of the Baltic states, the structure of the output of MNCs 
of Estonia in Russia has significantly diversified: enterprises in the food industry, 
production of building materials, paper and paper products, and furniture have 
appeared, while the contribution of MNCs in the transportation and storage ser-
vices industry has decreased. Russian MNCs have diversified their representa-
tion in Latvia including projects in the fields of hotels, financial and insurance 
activities, and telecommunications technologies.






Fig. 5. Contribution of MNCs to the gross output, Russia - Baltic states, 2005-2016, % 
Note: The analysis period is limited by the availability of data in AMNE OECD database. 
Source: authors' calculations, data from AMNE OECD database. 
 
Based on the estimates obtained, we conclude that the activities of MNCs are more resilient to 
geopolitical and economic shocks than foreign trade is. At the same time, the absence of any 
pronounced trends in their activities in the markets of the Baltic states and Russia should be 
attributed to that fact that the actions of MNCs were initially determined by their investment 
strategies in the absence of pronounced support of the host economies, and, in a later period, by 
contrast, by the growth of protectionist measures and tension in foreign economic cooperation. 
This finding generally corresponds to other conclusions on the relationship between the Baltic 
states and Russia (e.g., [27, p. 1277-1278]) stating that investment flows between them are 
synchronized with the economic cycles of the partner countries, therefore, the changes in 
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Fig. 5. Contribution of MNCs to the gross output, Russia — Baltic states,  
2005—2016, %
Note: The analysis period is limited by the availability of data in AMNE OECD 
database.
Source: authors’ calculations, data from AMNE OECD database.
Based on the estimates obtained, we conclude that the activities of MNCs 
are more resilient to geopolitical and economic shocks than foreign trade is. At 
the same time, the absence of any pronounced trends in their activities in the 
markets of the Baltic states and Russia should be attributed to that fact that the 
actions of MNCs were initially determined by their investment strategies in the 
absence of pronounced support of the host economies, and, in a later period, by 
contrast, by the growth of protectionist measures and tension in foreign eco-
nomic cooperation. This finding generally corresponds to other conclusions on 
the relationship between the Baltic states and Russia (e. g., [27, p. 1277—1278]) 
stating that investment flows between them are synchronized with the economic 
cycles of the partner countries, therefore, the changes in international trade are 
translated into the results of investment flows only through the prism of invest-
ment cycles.
Prospects for the transformation of global value chains  
in Russia and the Baltic states
By the beginning of 2020, the economic relations between the Baltic states 
and Russia were characterized by the continuing regime of mutual sanctions as 
a result of the Ukrainian conflict. Although the warming of relations between 
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Russia and the EU has rarely been an issue for discussion in the academic liter-
ature and on the foreign policy agenda, experts have noted that manufacturers in 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are extremely cautious about the prospects of ex-
panding foreign economic contacts with Russia and thus primarily rely on other 
foreign markets [12, p. 10—11; 28; 29]. Among the most promising prospects 
for the country’s enterprises Russian literature names those in the markets of the 
Eurasian Economic Union countries, East and Southeast Asia, and Africa. This 
may indirectly indicate the lack of visible prospects for expanding cooperation 
with Western markets [30, p. 46].
The economic crisis caused by the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic 
could be a shock that changes the mood of both parties and contributes to the 
transformation of GVCs in Russia and the Baltic states.
A possible long-term effect of the COVID-19 pandemic is the changes in the 
level of uncertainty perceived by companies and the public. To reduce risks with-
in the chains, coordination between their individual links will be strengthened. 
Thus, one of the expected GVC transformations is the regionalization of value 
chains1 [3]. This can be the result of both the withdrawal of MNCs from global 
chains and building their own chains at the regional level, and the transfer of ex-
isting capacities to an MNS’s home region. At the same time, new multinational 
corporations may emerge that, due to their scale, will be more prepared for the 
risks and shocks in global production. An increase in the perceived level of risks 
for the population can determine the growth of interest in neighbouring territo-
ries (interestingly, this is already being observed) and the desire to operate and 
receive services in the nearest territories.
We highlight several reasons why the regionalization of GVCs as a conse-
quence of the COVID-19 pandemic can transform the foreign economic cooper-
ation between Russia and the Baltic states.
1. The analysis demonstrates that the value chains between Russia and the 
Baltic states are predominantly organized in industries with intensive use of local 
raw materials (agro-industries, steel and chemical industries). International ex-
perience shows that such chains, as a rule, are organized according to a regional 
rather than a global principle1. Hence, the most realistic scenario for their trans-
formation is an increase in regionalization. Their growth points are increasing 
market segmentation.
2. Prospects for the growth of regional value chains in Russia and the Baltic 
states are also found in industries generally characterized by a global organiza-
tion. These are primarily the power and electrical engineering and equipment 
manufacturing industries. A mutually beneficial strategy could be to increase the 
added value in production through industrial cooperation, pulling the elements of 
global chains to the Baltic region.
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3. Despite the relative success of repositioning the Baltic states in the GVC 
[5, p. 32—33; 9, p. 5—9; 10, p. 9—10] and the absence of positive changes for 
Russia [8, p. 6—8; 26, p. 73—74], these countries are characterized by gener-
ally similar problems of participation in chains, for example, a significant gap 
between the technological level of the main layer of companies and that of lead-
ing companies, a low share of firms operating in foreign markets, and serious 
challenges to increasing labour productivity. The increased risks of working in 
distant markets may force firms in Russia and the Baltic states to reconsider their 
geographic priorities.
4. Regionalization of the value chains of Russia and the Baltic states can oc-
cur under the influence of business initiatives without critical shifts in foreign 
economic relations. This follows from the experience of chain development in 
the countries in the previous two decades. In addition, any shifts in interregional 
cooperation between Russia and the Baltic states are possible only with a signifi-
cant lag, while business decisions can be made much faster.
5. The steady growth of mutual trade in services between Russia and the Bal-
tic states demonstrates the continued interest of their population in neighbouring 
territories, which is explained by the attractiveness and demand for services in 
the border areas, including in the fields of culture, education, tourism, and real es-
tate, not only by national diasporas but also by titular ethnic groups of respective 
territories. The growing global uncertainty and the maintaining attractiveness of 
services in the border areas can strengthen the countries’ interest in cooperation 
in the service sector.
While at the national level the discussion of expanding foreign economic 
cooperation between Russia and the Baltic states can be restrained by the com-
plexity of interstate political and economic relations, the available data and dis-
cussion in the expert and academic literature make it possible to determine the 
high potential for the development of cross-border cooperation between the two 
territories.
Although in 2012—2019 no increase was observed in the importance of the 
Baltic states as a market for Russian exports in general, it was seen in certain 
border areas, in particular, St. Petersburg, Leningrad, and Kaliningrad regions. 
Notably, after the introduction of mutual sanctions as a result of the Ukrainian 
conflict in 2014, the share of the Baltic states in the exports of these regions in-
creased: for the Leningrad region, from 2.9% to 10.0%, and for the Kaliningrad 
region, from 3.5% to 6.0% (Fig. 6).
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Russia, mln USD Kaliningrad region, % St. Petersburg, %
Leningrad region, % Russia, %
Fig. 6. The share of the Baltics in gross exports of Russia and chosen regions:  
left axis — % of gross exports; right axis — USD million, 2012—2019
Source: authors’ calculations, data from the Federal Customs Service of the Russian 
Federation.
The high importance of the regional level of interaction in the Baltic Sea re-
gion is determined, in particular, by a special type of a territorial community that 
formed as a result of the end of the Cold War— a transboundary macro-region, 
the emergence of which shows that regional cooperation is reaching a new level 
[31, p. 129]. Consequently, many cross-border projects start on the basis of inter-
action between regional and local authorities [32, p. 349—350]. It is important 
to say that the priority projects were formed based on more than the principles 
of exchange and were formed not only in the field of economics but also in the 
scientific and technological sphere [11, p. 88—89; 32, p. 352]. This is especially 
significant in the context of discussing the prospects for expanding regional val-
ue chains of Russia and the Baltic states because industrial cooperation in such 
chains to increase the contribution of added value includes not only agreements 
on industrial cooperation and subcontracting but also cooperation schemes in re-
search and development activities in the early stages of chains.
The expansion of economic cooperation between Russia and the Baltic states 
in the new conditions will be largely supported by a further qualitative increase 
in non-industrial formats of cooperation. In the context of tense relations be-
tween Russia and the Baltic states, political confrontation, often demonstrative, 
depletes the possibilities of official diplomacy [33, p. 113—114]. Hence, the use 
of «soft power» can become an effective tool for the development of relations, 
including such formats as humanitarian funds and cooperation in the fields of 
science, education, culture, health care, and environment protection [32, p. 354; 
33, p. 113—114, 34, p. 110;]. In our opinion, the «soft power» potential has been 
underexploited. At the level of individual organizations, only a few institutions 
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are singling out the Baltic states as geographic priorities for their strategic de-
velopment. For instance, at the level of the leading Russian universities, one of 
such organizations is the Baltic Federal University, which defines its strategic 
development through the prism of its location on a special territory bordering the 
countries of the Baltic region. However, finding similar examples among the uni-
versities of St. Petersburg, which have strong innovation, research, educational, 
and cultural potential, is difficult. In addition, greater international cooperation is 
required to address social issues (largely reinforced by the consequences of the 
COVID-19 pandemic) in the fields of environment protection, education, health-
care, and medicine, which can enhance the cooperation between Russia and the 
Baltic states.
The prospects for expanding economic interaction and harnessing the poten-
tial of “soft power” between Russia and the Baltics in the context of regional-
ization of value chains require discussing the implications for economic policy. 
The prospects for the regionalization of chains can form a new round of growing 
interest in cooperation on both sides and will thus provide a revision or, rather, an 
expansion of the economic policy’s toolbox of all parties involved.
Policy implications
The study of foreign economic relations between Russia and the Baltic states 
suggests a high level of stability of ties and a weak response to economic and 
geopolitical shocks. The Baltic states, being an integral part of the Soviet Union, 
were well integrated into the system of foreign economic relations of the USSR. 
The developed infrastructure, including hard (e. g., roads, railways, ports) and 
soft one (e. g., business communities, inter-firm ties, national diasporas), largely 
determined the preservation of relations between Russia and the Baltics, which 
in the modern period can be generally described as tense. In particular, in 2000—
2019, the mutual trade within GVCs constantly expanded largely due to the ac-
tivities of multinational companies.
The COVID-19 pandemic has intensified the challenges in global manufac-
turing and temporarily disrupted value chains. The impact of the COVID-19 pan-
demic on the global economy has been significantly stronger than that of previous 
crises, including the global financial and economic crisis of 2008—2009 [35]. 
Along with the temporary effect of chain disruption, there is an expected long-
term effect associated with the restructuring of models of global production and 
international cooperation.
New challenges for global production can become a factor in the structur-
al transformation of economic relations between Russia and the Baltic states. 
From the possible scenarios of recovery and changes in GVCs, the most likely 
scenario is the regionalization of chains in Russia and the Baltic states, includ-
ing the building of their own chains at the regional level in traditional industries 
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(agro-industries, steel industry, mechanical engineering, chemical industry) and 
relocation of available capacity into the home region (e. g., in the automotive in-
dustry, chemical industry, wood processing).
We also observe the expansion of the prospects for regionalization within the 
framework of non-economic cooperation to address global challenges provoked 
by the COVID-19 pandemic, including those in the fields of education, environ-
ment protection, health care, and medicine. Such cooperation, in our opinion, 
can become an instrument of «soft power» and contribute to the development of 
economic relations.
Considering the experience of foreign economic interactions between Russia 
and the Baltic states, and the persisting difficulties in relations at the interstate 
level, new challenges in the transformation of chains make it possible to for-
mulate consequences for state policy aimed at transforming the structure of the 
Russian economy and repositioning in global production.
1. At the level of individual Russian regions of the northwest, we advise con-
sidering the implementation of a policy aimed at developing production potential, 
supporting mutual direct investments, and building regional value chains with the 
Baltic states. To date, an argument could be that only in the Kaliningrad region 
is the expansion of border ties a priority of its socio-economic development. We 
posit that this practice can also be transferred to the other territories of the Rus-
sian northwest.
2. As the prospects of the lifting of the regime of mutual sanctions between 
Russia and the EU remain uncertain, the development of cooperation in industries 
not under this regime is especially important for the regionalization of GVCs. 
This is primarily related to industrial cooperation in the field of research and de-
velopment, as well as the provision of services that require highly skilled labour. 
For these purposes, we advise considering the possibility of developing networks 
of international cooperation in the field of industrial knowledge and technologies, 
including on the basis of leading universities in the Baltic states and the border 
regions of Russia.
3. The role of «soft power» in the establishment of economic cooperation 
between Russia and the Baltic states in the new conditions has significantly in-
creased. Additionally, expansion of interaction with business, national diaspo-
ras, and an increase in the role of socially oriented non-profit organizations are 
considered directions for its further improvement. First, we recommend devel-
oping tools for the formation and strengthening of cross-border ties of business 
communities, including the consolidation of ties between national entrepreneurs 
and representatives of national diasporas abroad; attracting business to the im-
plementation of social functions; supporting social projects and joint initiatives 
of representatives of diasporas. As for the regional-level tools, we recommend 
developing regional programs to support small and medium-sized businesses’ 
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initiatives to enter the Baltic states’ markets, as well as socially oriented business 
initiatives in the fields of education, culture, art, to expand cooperation between 
Russia and the Baltics.
4. To expand cooperation, we recommend increasing the number of mutual 
entry points of Russia and the Baltic states. First, concerning Russia, it is nec-
essary to spread the practice of the Kaliningrad region, as a region strategically 
oriented toward cooperation with the Baltic states, to other regions of northwest 
Russia. It is important to consolidate at the level of strategic priorities, to expand 
interaction with the Baltic states on the infrastructure, to support small and medi-
um-sized businesses in the border areas, large scientific and educational centres, 
and cultural centres. This will set a framework for the development of specific 
interaction programs, for example, international competitions for start-ups and 
innovative entrepreneurship, joint development projects in the fields of educa-
tional, medical, tourism services, and the formation of relevant clusters in border 
areas.
5. The potential for the development of cooperation between Russia and the 
Baltics and accumulated successes of individual regions in cross-border cooper-
ation determine the possibility of processing certain elements of economic inter-
action between the northwest regions and the Baltic states, with subsequent use 
in other Russian border territories.
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